Google says Russian group COLD RELIC used data stolen from one US organisation's cloud to breach a second

· CyberSecurity

TLDR

  • Google says COLD RELIC used late-2025 data from one US organisation to impersonate its employee and breach another.1
  • The second target was approached over an encrypted messaging app, then sent links stealing Entra ID credentials and tokens.1
  • The attackers kept access for several months, using attacker-enrolled passkeys that survived password and session resets.1

Google's Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) say the Russian state-sponsored espionage group COLD RELIC used data, the corporate staff directory and identities stolen from a US-based organisation in late 2025 to compromise a second US-based organisation in 2026.12 GTIG names the group as formerly tracked as COLDRIVER and UNC4057, and also known as Star Blizzard, Callisto and Gossamer Bear.1 It says the US Department of Justice has assessed that the group operates within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB), and The Record reports that US authorities have linked it to the FSB.13 GTIG's post is dated 17 November 2026, and press coverage followed on 18 November.13 The Record adds that the researchers did not identify either organisation or say what information was stolen.3

In the first intrusion, GTIG says the group used a residential proxy network in the US located close to the victim, authenticated with the stolen credentials of a Super Admin account, and combined them with an MFA push notification fatigue attack.1 After the user accepted an MFA request, the group registered a device model not previously seen in the victim's tenant, and kept access through passkeys, MFA backup codes and rogue MFA devices.1 GTIG says they downloaded the contents of the entire cloud storage drive, both by mass sharing files to an email account they operated and by downloading files directly.1 They also accessed the Admin Console, queried security investigation and email audit logs, and viewed, modified and deleted Alert Center notifications to remove evidence of the intrusion.1 GTIG adds that they exported full employee lists and started a domain-wide export through Google Workspace Customer Takeout using Super Admin privileges.1 Over several months the group synced the email inbox to external email clients through OAuth and re-authenticated using attacker-enrolled passkeys that had not been revoked and that persisted across password and session resets.1 The Record says they kept reading emails through third-party applications and found ways to regain access after the organisation changed passwords and reset user sessions.3 After the group was removed, GTIG saw them use email accounts impersonating employees of the victim to target internal staff and associates in the same professional circles.1

The second intrusion began with a Microsoft Entra ID user account at a US-based organisation that used Entra ID as its federated single sign-on identity provider for Google Workspace.1 GTIG says the group impersonated an employee of the first organisation to set up a pretext for conversation over a secure messaging app, then shared phishing links meant to steal credentials and authentication tokens for Entra ID.1 The links redirected the victim to document lures relevant to the conversation, and after the stolen credentials were used the group registered a new MFA device in the single sign-on solution to keep access to the account.1 They then carried out a bulk download of the files accessible in the compromised user's cloud drive.1 The Record describes the stolen credentials as Microsoft account logins, and Dark Reading reports that the attackers used the stolen Entra ID credentials and tokens to reach the organisation's Google Workspace environment through federated single sign-on.36 GTIG says a redirector URL from the intrusion, submitted to VirusTotal in June 2026, carried a query parameter referencing the first victim organisation.1 It also says the messaging app account later had its profile name changed to a different person, which GTIG believes was likely used to target other organisations in the same professional circles.14 GTIG has observed evidence of new COLD RELIC phishing operations as recently as November 2026.1

GTIG recommends enriching authentication logs with residential proxy and VPN IP reputation feeds and applying conditional access policies to block or detect logons from known proxy networks.1 Infosecurity Magazine reports that Google also recommends cloud storage data loss prevention policies, because users stored credentials and other secrets in cloud storage, revoking all user sessions and forcing password resets once an intrusion is identified, enforcing phishing-resistant MFA such as hardware keys, and restricting and auditing passkey registrations.5 Dark Reading reports GTIG's Wes Shields advising employees to verify an unusual message through a separate, previously established channel, and Google's Joseph Spero advising teams to audit OAuth grants and to revoke sessions as well as reset passwords and MFA mechanisms when a compromise is suspected.6

Why it matters: GTIG says a single cloud compromise gave COLD RELIC the staff directory and identities to pose as a trusted contact, so the second victim was approached by someone posing as a person in their professional circles.1

Sources

  1. COLD RELIC: A Case Study in Impersonation and Compromise (Google Cloud Blog (GTIG and Mandiant))
  2. Russian COLD RELIC Hackers Use Stolen Google Workspace Data to Breach Second U.S. Organization (The Hacker News)
  3. Russian cyber-espionage group used stolen cloud data to hack into organizations, Google says (The Record from Recorded Future News)
  4. Russian APT Poses as Employee of Hacked Firm to Breach Another US Organization (SecurityWeek)
  5. Russian Espionage Actor Star Blizzard Focuses on Cloud Identities for Mass Data Theft (Infosecurity Magazine)
  6. Russia's Cold Relic APT Turns One Cloud Breach Into Another (Dark Reading)