OVHcloud says a hacker used a developer's GitHub account to replace releases of its open-source CLI with a secret-stealing binary

TLDR

• OVHcloud says a hacker used a developer's GitHub account to swap five CLI releases for a secret-stealing binary.¹²
• The tampered files were live for about 90 minutes on 19 October before a customer's report.¹²
• Affected users should change every secret on the machine; researchers' link to GlassWorm is their own inference.¹²

OVHcloud chief executive Octave Klaba disclosed on X that a hacker used the GitHub account of one of the company's developers to add a binary to its open-source command-line interface (CLI) tool, with the job of retrieving secrets from the disk.¹² He said the quality of the binary is poor but that it can go all the way.¹² OVHcloud lists versions v0.11.0 through v0.15.0 as compromised, with v0.10.0 and the new v0.16.0 clean.¹² According to Klaba, the tampered release went live at 14:47 Paris time on 19 October and was blocked at 16:21 after a customer reported it.¹² Anyone who installed or updated the CLI on macOS, 64-bit Linux or Windows through the install script, Homebrew or a direct GitHub download in that period is affected, whereas builds from source, Go's install command and the official Docker image are not, according to SecurityWeek.¹ Klaba urged affected users to change all the secrets on their disk.²

The sources differ on the exposure. SecurityWeek describes a roughly 94-minute period.¹ Dark Reading, citing OVHcloud's postmortem, says the malicious binaries were available for one hour and 33 minutes and were downloaded about 250 times.³ OVHcloud's postmortem, as Dark Reading reports it, says the cause was that the GitHub repository was not configured for release immutability, which meant assets could be altered after publication, and that the fix has been applied to every repository.³ Klaba said OVHcloud's CI/CD pipelines, including its tests and CVE detection, were not affected, because a user with the right permissions could modify existing GitHub releases directly without any checks from the pipeline.² Dark Reading adds that OVHcloud's main production CI/CD runs on an internally hosted private Git instance, and that its security team found no other affected repositories.³

Attribution is where the accounts diverge most. OpenSourceMalware, a threat intelligence platform, ties the attack to the GlassWorm threat actors through a Solana wallet address that is a known GlassWorm indicator, but the researchers say that putting the earlier account compromise and the October attack down to the same actor is only their inference.¹² They say the account belonged to a legitimate OVHcloud contributor and had been compromised since at least March 2026, when personal repositories were rewritten and a hidden loader was planted.¹² Help Net Security adds that, according to OpenSourceMalware, the binary was built on a workstation and uploaded over five existing releases rather than through the pipeline.² SecurityWeek notes that OVHcloud's statements do not mention GlassWorm, while Dark Reading says OVHcloud's postmortem concurs that the Solana wallet points to GlassWorm and traces the developer's compromise to a poisoned extension installed on a personal MacBook on 20 October 2025.¹³ A Socket spokesperson told Dark Reading the behaviours are consistent with GlassWorm loaders but that Socket has not independently analysed the October CLI binaries and has not established whether the wallet address OVHcloud cites appears in a later payload stage.³ OVHcloud deleted the malicious files before anyone archived them, so OpenSourceMalware could not analyse the payload.¹²

Why it matters: the incident shows how a single long-compromised developer account can be turned into a supply-chain attack by overwriting already-published release files, and it puts secrets on developer and operations workstations at risk for anyone who pulled the tampered builds during the short period they were available.¹²³