Attackers use credentials tied to Qubole's AWS account to steal secrets and S3 data from customers
TLDR
- Wiz says an attacker used IAM credentials tied to Qubole's AWS account to assume roles in multiple customer environments.1
- The attacker took secrets from Lambda, Secrets Manager and SSM Parameter Store, then copied S3 data.1
- Wiz advises reviewing CloudTrail from 1 October, removing unused Qubole trust and rotating secrets the role could read.1
Wiz, working with Sentra and Mandiant, says a threat actor used IAM credentials from an AWS account associated with Qubole between 14 and 26 October 2026 to assume IAM roles that customers had created to trust Qubole's account.1 Qubole is a data lake platform owned by Idera, The Hacker News reports.4 Customers of platforms like Qubole create a role in their own AWS account whose trust policy lets the vendor's account assume it, typically gated by an External ID.1 Wiz says the first activity it saw was on 14 October, when a Mullvad VPN address called AssumeRole from account 805246085872 using an IAM user it has not seen in any other activity, and that a second IAM user from the same account was used from 18 October.1 Every request carried an External ID and every one succeeded, and most of the roles were otherwise unused but still trusted Qubole's account.1 Sentra says none of the activity came from Qubole's own network and that it all came from a rented OVH server and the Mullvad VPN.2 The Hacker News reports that how the attacker obtained the credentials has not been disclosed.4
Inside victim environments, Wiz says the attacker enumerated resources, listed Lambda functions and read their environment variables, pulled values from Secrets Manager and read SSM Parameter Store entries.1 It then used TruffleHog to test credentials it found: AWS access keys, Entra ID client secrets and Okta client credentials belonging to the victims, not to the vendor.1 The attacker also downloaded data from S3, taking whatever buckets each role could reach and in some cases whole buckets in one session, which Wiz describes as opportunistic.1 Sentra, giving its own account of what it saw, says the attacker read about 100 passwords and keys in seven minutes, made no write actions, first took thousands of customer-profile files and later pulled production database backups.2 Wiz has not tied the campaign to other publicly reported activity and says it has no insight into how the stolen data will be used.1 It also found a bootable ISO file hosted on an attacker-controlled IP address, said it has not identified any deployments of it, and described a separate set of Qubole-related activity on 8 to 11 October using customers' own AWS access keys that it cannot link to the role abuse.1
Sentra says it spotted suspicious activity across several customer environments and reported it to Wiz.12 The number of victims is not settled. Wiz declined to tell The Register how many organisations were affected, calling it a broad, opportunistic supply chain campaign that hit multiple customer environments.3 Sentra's post says more than a dozen organisations were hacked in one passage and dozens of Qubole customers were impacted in another.2 The Hacker News reports that several victims lacked the S3 logging needed to show which objects were read, and Sentra says files using only default encryption leave no trail, so its count of files taken is likely low.24 The Register reports that neither AWS nor Qubole responded to its questions, and The Hacker News reports that neither Qubole nor Idera had posted a statement and that the researchers did not say whether the credentials have been disabled or the activity has stopped.34
Wiz advises anyone integrated with Qubole to review CloudTrail from 1 October in every account holding an integration role, looking for AssumeRole events from account 805246085872 with a non-AWS source IP, the IAM user ID AIDA3W7DIFLYOLTK63SFS, and role sessions named with the prefix quiam-.1 If a role was assumed, it says to rotate every secret, parameter and Lambda environment variable the role could read and revoke active sessions, noting that rotating a credential does not end sessions already issued.1 Wiz also recommends deleting integration roles that are no longer used, narrowing the trusted principal, adding an aws:SourceIp or aws:SourceVpce condition, and treating the External ID as non-secret, saying "a source IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption we observed."1 The Hacker News adds that Qubole's setup guide includes a sample S3 policy that lets the role read every bucket in the account, and Sentra lists notifying Qubole among its five recommended actions.24
Why it matters: the attacker's requests were accepted because customers had left roles trusting a vendor account in place, and Wiz says a source IP condition alone would have blocked every role assumption it observed.1
Sources
- Trusted by Default: Qubole Cross-Account Access Abused in the Wild (Wiz)
- One Stolen Vendor Key, Every Customer's Data Exposed: Inside the Qubole Supply Chain Attack (Sentra)
- Attackers backdoor trusted AWS integrations to steal secrets (The Register)
- Hackers Exploit Qubole's Trusted AWS Access to Breach Customer Accounts and Steal Data (The Hacker News)