Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs as Huntress tracks six compromised providers and ConnectWise disables eight extensions
TLDR
- Huntress confirms exploitation of CVE-2026-84869 against MSP technicians: at least 688,000 guest requests hit 42 servers since 20 October.1213
- Huntress saw another SCKit spike on 13 November, across 205 hosts in 41 organisations.15
- ConnectWise says the investigation is complete; on-premises partners must disable extensions and everyone must verify clients run 26.6.5 or later.215
ConnectWise is investigating an active malware campaign against managed service providers (MSPs) in which compromised ScreenConnect environments are used to deploy rogue remote-access clients to customer devices, BleepingComputer reports.1 Security firm Huntress first discovered the campaign on Wednesday 11 November and says it has identified six compromised MSPs and at least 286 affected endpoints across 47 organisations, with the number of victims continuing to rise.1 In a post to Reddit quoted by BleepingComputer, Huntress said its SOC was working a campaign that started around 17:47 UTC that day against cloud-hosted ScreenConnect instances.1 According to Huntress, the attackers use ScreenConnect's Run Command functionality to deploy ScreenConnect clients on managed endpoints, giving them remote access outside the legitimate MSP's own ScreenConnect environment.1
ConnectWise published a security advisory at 22:45 UTC on 11 November, with its status listed as cause and scope under investigation.2 It says it is aware of reports of unauthorised access to ScreenConnect partner accounts and of unauthorised remote-access software being deployed in customer environments.2 ConnectWise identified five independent third-party extensions that may be associated with the activity (Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link) and found about 400 partner environments with one or more of them, and it disabled the extensions as a precaution.2 It advises on-premise partners to disable them themselves, and that the presence of an extension does not by itself establish impact.2 It suspects the threat actor deployed additional remote-access software through those extensions, and it also describes potential compromise of technician workstations during interactive connections to affected devices; it says these behaviours remain subject to validation.2 BleepingComputer reports that Huntress warned of a possibly more dangerous technique in which an attacker compromises an MSP technician's workstation when the technician starts a ScreenConnect session with an infected customer device, and that it is unclear how this works or whether it exploits a software vulnerability or abuses legitimate functionality.1
On how the attackers got in, ConnectWise says the initial access method and full scope have not been established.2 BleepingComputer reports that Huntress has not determined how the attackers reach MSP environments, but that its telemetry points to compromised credentials and hijacked MSP support sessions.1 Huntress also told BleepingComputer that sequential attacker-assigned tags suggest other MSPs may have been compromised earlier, so ScreenConnect users should check their Run Command history even without alerts, and it has shared indicators of compromise including rogue client IDs and attacker infrastructure.1 Sophos X-Ops separately describes, in one observed case, unauthorised ScreenConnect client deployments in which curl.exe downloaded a ScreenConnect installer to the Windows Temp folder and msiexec.exe installed it silently, followed by a PowerShell second-stage script.3 Sophos lists three ScreenConnect instance IDs that it believes are likely compromised and are being used to deploy two malicious instances, one of which, ed630cc2c873b091, BleepingComputer describes as a rogue client ID identified by Huntress.13
For defenders, ConnectWise advises partners not to open interactive ScreenConnect sessions to suspected compromised devices, to revoke active ScreenConnect and identity-provider sessions, reset passwords from a trusted device and verify that multifactor authentication is enforced.2 It also tells partners to retain authentication, extension installation, administrative, Run Command and Toolbox records.2 BleepingComputer found an earlier malicious batch script, uploaded to VirusTotal on 25 July 2026 and that appears to impersonate a Social Security Administration statement, references a rogue client ID (ed630cc2c873b091); BleepingComputer says it is unclear whether that activity and the current MSP attacks are part of the same campaign.1
Update, 13 November 2026: Huntress's own post, published on 11 November and since updated, puts the campaign at no fewer than 288 managed endpoints across 48 organisations that use Huntress, against the 286 endpoints and 47 organisations BleepingComputer first reported.18 Huntress says all 288 hosts were affected within 90 minutes of the activity starting at about 17:47 UTC on 11 November, with about a third in the first 10 minutes.8 The Hacker News, BleepingComputer and SecurityWeek all attribute the 288 and 48 figures to Huntress, and SecurityWeek, citing Huntress, gives at least six MSPs.467 Blackpoint Cyber says its own security operations centre responded on 11 November to widespread unauthorised ScreenConnect deployments through cloud-hosted instances, and that its Adversary Pursuit Group recovered the loader from the attacker's staging server.9
On how the attackers got in, Huntress's post says it has learned the activity seems to be related to RMM+, one of the five extensions ConnectWise disabled.8 It says versions 1.0.31 and 1.0.32 accepted a blank access key when an administrator had never configured one, that RMM+ bypasses ScreenConnect's user accounts, roles and multifactor authentication, and that commands reached endpoints across several instances within minutes with no corresponding login activity.8 BleepingComputer and SecurityWeek report the same finding.67 The Hacker News had earlier reported that Huntress telemetry pointed to compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions.4 Blackpoint's Nevan Beal told The Hacker News that initial access appears linked to malicious ScreenConnect extensions but that there is not enough evidence to confirm it, and The Hacker News reports Blackpoint found no technical link between the five extensions and SCKit.5 ConnectWise's advisory update of 12 November at 18:45 UTC says it has found no evidence that initial access involved a ScreenConnect vulnerability, that it is assessing the researchers' RMM+ findings, and that a CVE has been assigned to the issue in the third-party extension.2
Huntress describes SCKit as a package of 16 files, and says it appears the RelayTrap source code was generated by a large language model.8 The toolkit is designed to spread from an infected endpoint to a technician who connects to it, steal the technician's .aspxauth session cookie and push commands to other endpoints through the Shared Toolbox.8 Huntress says it has not seen that spread succeed and that the console-takeover attempt failed so far in every recovered host log it checked.8 Blackpoint says the technique attempts a file-execution method associated with CVE-2026-84869, a ScreenConnect client file-transfer flaw rated CVSS 9.9, but that its test against a current client was blocked by the existing patch.589 ConnectWise says the fix in client version 26.6.5, released on 8 September 2026, blocks the endpoint-to-technician technique, and that updating a cloud console does not update technician clients.2 Its update also tells partners to update every technician client to 26.6.5 or later, disable the Transfer Files permission where it is not needed, keep the identified extensions disabled and investigate with separate tooling rather than ScreenConnect.2 ConnectWise adds that the figure of about 400 environments counts installations of the extensions, not confirmed compromises, and that it has no visibility into activity inside partner environments after initial access.2
Update, 14 November 2026: ConnectWise updated its advisory at 21:15 UTC on 13 November, changing the status to "Investigation ongoing; immediate protective action required for on-premise environments".2 It says third-party researchers are reporting additional activity against on-premises environments where the previously identified extensions remain enabled.2 ConnectWise has also disabled three further third-party extensions in cloud environments and its marketplace, ITBoost Integration, RepairShopr Integration and Guest Session Starter, and strongly encourages all partners to do the same.2 It says it cannot disable extensions in on-premises environments on partners' behalf, repeats that client version 26.6.5 and later blocks the toolkit's attempted endpoint-to-technician spread technique, and says updating clients does not replace disabling the extensions or investigating a suspected compromise.2
Microsoft Security Research, in a post dated 13 November, says Microsoft Threat Intelligence has confirmed ConnectWise's reported activity and has observed threat actors using ScreenConnect to install unauthorised remote-access clients and deploy SCKit on customer-managed endpoints.10 Microsoft says SCKit sets up persistence through scheduled tasks and registry Run entries, and that removing an unauthorised client alone does not remove that persistence or invalidate exposed web sessions.10 It says the toolkit searches Chrome, Edge, Opera and Opera GX profiles for .ASPXAUTH cookies, either by copying cookie databases or by scanning browser process memory, then, by design, uses the cookie to upload a payload and queue it for execution through the Shared Toolbox.10 Microsoft describes the dashed technician-targeting path in its diagram as the toolkit's propagation design, not a confirmed sequence of infections, and says the entry method for the campaign remains under investigation.10 It advises investigating through a separate channel such as Defender for Endpoint live response and not using the kit's own cleanup script, because the cleanup mode can relaunch the bundled dropper.10
Separately, Huntress reports unauthorised guest sessions with crypto-exchange-themed names, such as KUCOIN-SRV and LAPTOP-BINANCE, on at least 118 self-hosted ScreenConnect servers belonging to 109 Huntress-protected organisations, with 2,408 unauthorised sessions enrolled since 3 November.11 A later section of the post gives 2,223 fake sessions on 118 servers across 109 accounts.11 Huntress says 97.8 per cent of the crypto-named guest connections came from one IONOS-hosted IP address, that it has seen no evidence of malicious activity from the sessions, and that it has found no overlap with the published SCKit indicators.11 Its leading hypothesis is that the sessions are bait for a technician running an unpatched client, which could be exploited through CVE-2026-84869, but it says it has not seen them used that way.11 Huntress advises updating technician clients to 26.6.5 or later and barring technicians from joining sessions they cannot tie to a customer.11
Update, 18 November 2026: Huntress published a post on 16 November confirming in-the-wild exploitation of CVE-2026-84869, the ScreenConnect client file-transfer flaw rated CVSS 9.9, which lets a guest push a file to a connecting technician's host and get the technician's own client to run it with no prompt.12 SecurityWeek reports a month-long campaign against MSP servers, and Huntress says that since 20 October it has seen at least 688,000 guest "run file" requests for update.bat-style files hit 42 MSP ScreenConnect servers from 29 IP addresses, waiting for a technician to join.1213 On 12 November a technician's workstation at one MSP ran a guest-pushed batch file that reported to a Telegram bot, downloaded an installer and started a rogue ScreenConnect client pointed at the attacker's relay, all in about nine seconds, Huntress says; on 13 November a second technician's client ran an attacker "canary" text file.12 Huntress says at least four more technicians were exposed to guest-pushed files in October, including a path-traversal attempt to drop a script into a technician's Startup folder, whereas Cybersecurity Dive describes those four as compromised.1214 CISA added CVE-2026-84869 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue on 11 September, three days after ConnectWise's fix.121314
Huntress says this activity is distinct from the crypto-exchange-named sessions, SecurityWeek says it differs from the SCKit campaign, and Huntress says SCKit appears to use a vulnerable server-side extension rather than exploit the CVE directly.1213 Huntress's John Hammond told Cybersecurity Dive that the CVE concerns the client-side component technicians use, and that although it was meant to be part of the SCKit chain to spread to downstream clients, that "never succeeded".14 Cybersecurity Dive also reports that the critical flaw in the RMM+ extension has been assigned CVE-2026-127063.14 The Hacker News reports that Huntress detected another spike in SCKit-related activity on 13 November, affecting 205 hosts across 41 organisations, with the new client hosted at 185.241.211[.]197, which Huntress associates with 1337 Services GmbH, a bulletproof hosting provider, and in one incident a rogue client persisting as a LocalSystem service named Windows Update Agent.15
ConnectWise updated its advisory at 20:00 UTC on 16 November, changing the status to "Investigation complete; partner action remains required".2 It says completion does not establish that individual environments are unaffected, that on-premises partners must immediately disable the identified extensions and update ScreenConnect to the latest supported version, and that all partners must verify every technician client is on 26.6.5 or later, because updating the server alone does not confirm that.2 It adds that disabling extensions and updating software do not remove unauthorised access or persistence already established on devices.2 Huntress says that in the cases it describes, many technicians were still on 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 clients weeks after the fix shipped, and advises removing the TransferFiles permission if clients cannot be updated straight away.12
Why it matters: ConnectWise says updating the server alone does not confirm technician clients are updated, and in the cases it describes Huntress found many technicians on 22.x, 24.2 and 25.8 clients weeks after the fix, so MSPs should verify every technician client is on 26.6.5 or later.212
Sources
- Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations (BleepingComputer)
- November 11, 2026 ScreenConnect security advisory: Precautionary extension disabling and partner guidance (ConnectWise)
- Malicious ScreenConnect deployments observed (Sophos)
- ScreenConnect Attacks Target at Least 288 Endpoints Across 48 Organizations With Rogue Clients (The Hacker News)
- SCKit Malware Turns ScreenConnect Support Sessions Into Potential MSP Attack Paths (The Hacker News)
- New worm-like 'SCKit' malware targets MSPs in ScreenConnect attacks (BleepingComputer)
- Hackers Deploy Malware in Fresh ScreenConnect Campaign (SecurityWeek)
- SCKit Worm Installs Rogue ScreenConnect Clients and Session Cookie Relays Across Hundreds of Endpoints (Huntress)
- ScreenConnect Attack: SCKit Turns Remote Support Into an Attack Platform (Blackpoint Cyber)
- SCKit abuses ScreenConnect to deploy remote access and target technician sessions (Microsoft Security Blog)
- Attackers use Crypto Exchange Names to Disguise Unauthorized Sessions on 100+ ScreenConnect Servers (Huntress)
- CVE-2026-84869 in ScreenConnect Exploited to Run Malicious Files on MSP Technician Accounts (Huntress)
- MSP ScreenConnect Servers Targeted in Month-Long Campaign (SecurityWeek)
- Critical flaw in ScreenConnect exploited to run malicious files on MSP technician accounts (Cybersecurity Dive)
- ConnectWise Warns ScreenConnect Attacks Continue as SCKit Targets Unpatched Systems (The Hacker News)