Geolocation

Geolocation is the open-source practice of establishing where a photo or video was made by matching what it shows against satellite imagery, maps, webcam archives and other reference material. It can identify a site that officials confirm was hit but decline to name, and it gives an independent check on footage at the centre of a disputed claim.

In October 2026, analysts geolocated residents' footage to tie a drone-strike fire in Rostov-on-Don to an oil-loading terminal that supplies the Russian army, and outlets used webcam and satellite imagery to place a reported arson attack on Starlink antennas south of Sofia. The method fixes where footage was filmed, not the wider dispute around it, a limit shown by Misbar's work on video from Ethiopia's Tigray region and by a suggestion of Russian involvement in the Bulgarian fire for which The Insider said there was no evidence. GeoSpy and the US intelligence research agency IARPA aim to automate the matching, and analysts depend on reference imagery that can be scarce.

As of October 2026, the Rostov fire had reached its fourth day and spread to 8 of the terminal's 12 storage tanks, according to ASTRA, and no one had been charged over the Bulgarian antenna fire.

Naming sites officials leave unnamed

Geolocation can identify the target of an attack that authorities acknowledge without naming. After drones struck Rostov-on-Don overnight on 10 October 2026, Russian authorities confirmed a large fire but not which facility was burning. The OSINT outlet ASTRA geolocated photos and videos posted by residents to the NZNP oil-loading terminal, which supplies fuel to Russian troops, and the Telegram channel Exilenova+ reached the same facility independently. By 14 October the fire was in its fourth day and, by ASTRA's count, had spread to 8 of the terminal's 12 storage tanks.

The same approach located a reported sabotage attack in Bulgaria. Opposition MP Ivaylo Mirchev said two masked people burned 11 of 17 Starlink antennas at a "secret facility" near Sofia, and a surveillance still he posted shows a sign reading "Plana Earth Station". The Insider found structures typical of Starlink ground stations in satellite imagery of that site. Capital.bg matched it to the Plana teleport, a Vivacom station about 20 kilometres south of Sofia, and read a public webcam's archive as putting the fire's start at about 10:20 on 9 October, though Mirchev placed the attack that evening and The Insider called the timing unclear. Prime Minister Rumen Radev neither confirmed nor denied the claim, according to AFP, and prosecutors had charged no one.

Place, not responsibility

Geolocation establishes where footage was filmed, not what it proves about a wider dispute. Misbar matched landmarks against satellite imagery to place a video attributed to Eritrean forces inside Tigray on the A2 road in Idaga Hamus. The result does not settle troop movements that Ethiopia alleges and Eritrea denies, and with no independent geolocation of the same footage found as of October 2026, it rests on Misbar's method alone. The Bulgarian case left attribution open too: Mirchev suggested Russian intelligence was involved, but The Insider said there was no evidence of Russian involvement in the antenna fire.

Automated tools and reference imagery

Software aims to automate the matching. GeoSpy, from Graylark Technologies, estimates where a photo was taken from cues such as architecture and signage, comparing it against more than 46 million geolocated photos as of January 2025, and Graylark restricted the more accurate Pro version to law enforcement and verified businesses. IARPA's LocUS programme seeks AI that geolocates unlabelled video, images or audio without metadata or human guidance, targeting 90% of predictions within 250 metres. IARPA cites human-trafficking interdiction and hostage recovery as uses, though The Debrief noted the same capability would let intelligence and law-enforcement analysts strip anonymity from video posted online by anyone.

Reference imagery limits what analysts can check. Public Sentinel-2 imagery of Gaza is "very low resolution", according to an OSINT account that geolocates events there, which made a September 2026 lapse at Govmap, Israel's official mapping site, unusually valuable. The site briefly stopped blurring northern Gaza, exposing at least 11 Israeli military positions. Govmap re-applied the blur a day after the lapse was reported, but an OSINT account had already archived the imagery on the site Soar Atlas, so the fix closed the public view and not the record.